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Abstract 
This paper explores the main cleavages of the Croatian body politic, their interrelation and consequences for 
political behavior and collective identities through the two nationally representative surveys conducted in 
2007 and 2012 in time of parliamentary elections. The results show significant relationship between recent 
political cleavages, expressed through conspiracy theories, and the one from the Second World War. 
Analyzed conspiratorial interpretations, as well as historical legacy of military affiliation of ancestors in the 
Second World War are substantial predictors of party preferences. But, predictive power of these 
interpretations varies due to the level and issues of party competition in these two elections. Furthermore, 
different type conspiracy theories promote different political values, goals and identities and express wider 
political antagonism between nationalism and democratization. Also, analyzed conspiracy theories are highly 
correlated to the perception of “simulated democracy”, which is the common problem of newly established 
democracies, as well as the symptom of more global political crisis. 
Keywords: conspiracy theory, Croatia, historical legacy, political cleavages, simulated democracy. 
  
 
1. Introduction 
Conspiratorial interpretations are a part of everyday politics and have been highly present in 
politics since ancient times. From Homer’s theory of society (Popper, 1972), through great religious 
metaphysics organized against conspiracy of some cardinal Evil (Groh, 1987), and many historical 
examples, usually with lethal consequences (Neumann 1957/1992, Pipes 1997), conspiracy theories, along 
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with real conspiracies, culminated in modern revolutions, wars and political movements (Koselleck 1959, 
Hofstadter 1965, Pigden 1995, White 2002, Byford 2006). Political crises, authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes are fertile grounds for their appearance (Lasswell 1948, Moscovici 1987, Arendt 1951/1999). 
However, the apocalyptic role of conspiratorial thinking and acting found its extreme realization in the Nazi 
regime1. There are numerous examples of similar function of Conspiracy Theories (CTs) in both the 
communist and the democratic world2. In other words, democratic societies are not “vaccinated” against 
these perils, especially societies undergoing democratic transformations. 
Two lines of research and explanation of CTs’ popularity in the contemporary world can be 
discerned. The first line that originates from history3, political science4, social and political psychology5 
holds conspiratorial discourse as a particular ideological tradition usually related to radical politics of 
Fascism, Nazism, aggressive nationalism, populist movements etc. Contrary to this “localizing” approach, 
another line of research6 explores CTs from the perspective of literary and cultural studies. It observes CTs 
as a consequence of postmodern culture. Their historical conditions of existence lie in the globalized world 
of late capitalism where CT is an ideological apparatus used for personification of impersonal forms of 
control and establishing of rules. CTs express an ideological desire for undertaking a “cognitive mapping” of 
totalities on various societal levels. As such, they express radical doubt in the way of acquiring knowledge 
and authorities which convey it, to a large degree because of a sense of diminishing the abilities of human 
agency. So, in contrast to the first approach that mostly pathologises CTs, this one asserts them as a 
reasonable attempt to comprehend and position itself in this ever growing and threatening world. In the line 
of depathologizing of CTs, I propose an approach that will simultaneously avoid acceptance of CTs as facts 
and their mere reduction to a phenomenon of mass hysteria. In this way, CTs will be considered beyond 
the opposition between delusion and hidden truth. This approach considers CTs as social “facts”, i.e. more 
or less popular interpretations of politics regardless of their conclusiveness, but as powerful cultural and 
political narratives prominent in various media (cf. Arnold, 2008: VIII). From this perspective, they sketch 
antagonistically conceived relationships, reduced on the level of front between friends and foes, and in a 
distilled way glue the experience of political reality. Such conspiratorial narratives could be studied as 
symptoms of social mentality, but also as particular manifestations of wider political cleavages. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the main cleavages of the Croatian body politic, their 
interrelation and consequences for political behavior and collective identities. The origins of these 
cleavages stem from different historical points in time. The first one is the result of the national division in 
World War II. In this research it is presented as the memory of one’s own ancestors’ military affiliation in 
that war. The second cleavage stems from the memory of politically controversial events which occurred 
during the last 23 years, a period which is formative for Croatian democracy. This cleavage is explored 
through the beliefs in popular Croatian conspiracy theories from that period. Briefly, it manifests itself on 
one side as the perception of the so-called internal and external enemies and, on the other side, as the 
perception of corrupted behavior of the government. Accordingly, here we have the memory of two 
                                                          
1 After having gained power, Hitler tried to defeat the alleged conspiracy of the Elders of Zion by his own (and his fellows’) 
counter-conspiracy. 
2 For example, the “Red Scare”, 9/11, the theory of Saddam’s weaponry of mass destruction, recent interpretations of the EU 
crisis, etc. 
3 Representatives of this approach are Davis (1960), Hofstadter (1965), and Pipes (1997). 
4 Representatives of this approach are Lipset & Raab (1970), and Lee (2011). 
5 Representatives of this approach are Billig (1978), Robins & Post, (1997), and Glick (2005). 
6 Representatives of this approach are Jameson (1992), Dean (1998), Fenster (1999/2008), Knight (2000), Melley (2000), Arnold 
(2008), and Bratich (2008). 
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historical turning points, the first one from World War II and the second one from the recent time. They 
have been researched through the answers of Croatian citizens to questions collected in two surveys. The 
first one was conducted in 2007 and the second one in 2012, both in time of parliamentary elections. In this 
paper I will explore the relevance of these memories for the interpretation of the past, the present behavior 
and the future prospects concerning identity.  
 
 
2. Hypotheses 
The main hypotheses are: 
(a) Psychologically, these two cleavages are in a relationship of mutual reinforcement. From one direction, 
the older cleavage is partly reproduced in the recent one. So, the memory of one’s own political 
heritage influences the interpretation of the recent political events. It functions as a perceptual filter for 
the interpretation of recent events. But, a reverse relationship is also possible in which the recent 
cleavage finds its continuation from older times. Here, the recent cleavage projects itself into the past 
which functions as a posteriori explanation of the present. There is no consensus on the interpretation 
of these events and the divided memory of them is a resource for further crystallization of the older 
cleavage and for deepening of the recent one. 
(b) The recent cleavage expressed in conspiracy theories is constitutive for the present left-right cleavage 
in the Croatian body politic. Therefore, the belief in conspiracy theories is substantial predictor of party 
preferences. But predictive power of these interpretations will vary due to the level and issues of party 
competition.  
(c) Conspiracy Theories are not all the same. According to their content and inner structure, we can 
predict whether they promote a closed out ethnic identity and authoritarian values or an open 
unfinished identity, critical skills and democratic values.  
To corroborate these hypotheses, I will first introduce you to my research of CTs and other 
indicators of political cleavages. I’m interested in CTs in the realm of politics as an exclusion device, that is 
to say, as a tool for defining a threat to collective values and interests in order to maintain identity of one’s 
own group or society. It is the mode of interpretation for defining the enemy in order to define oneself as the 
opposite of that enemy. Hence, CT is the compact enunciation of the friend-foe political relationship and it 
should, therefore, be studied as a manifestation of political cleavages. Also, as an attempt at uncovering 
the hidden, discovering a secret, „shedding light“ on the supposed abuse of power CT is a sort of 
symptomal reading of the reality wherein it is assumed that, under the influence of the undeclared (hidden) 
interest (in domination, exploitation, etc.) there is a gap between the „official“, public meaning of some 
interpretation and its „actual“ intention, where there is a tension between the explicitly enunciated content of 
the text and its pragmatic presuppositions (Žižek 1994: 10). This kind of reading of the “true” reality, a sort 
of “behind-ology” (Spark 1998 in Bratich 2008: 15), also reveals the stereotypical (or petrified) images of 
the criticized agents and beloved objects of their endangerments. I will also try to read these symptomal 
readings symptomatically, as the signs of wider political cleavages and their various manifestations. 
 
 
3. Few words about the research method 
Croatian CTs have been researched through discourse analysis of the most influential Croatian 
political weekly magazines in the period from 1990 to 2007. The most prominent CTs have been selected 
for the survey research of the representative samples of Croatian citizens at the end of 2007 (n=1081) and 
beginning of 2012 (n=1002). The first survey was conducted before and the second one after parliamentary 
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elections7. Selected conspiratorial interpretations of actual politically relevant events, processes or 
behaviours of participants in the political life of Croatia or otherwise regarding Croatia in the last two 
decades, were translated into statements suitable for answering on the scale from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree and arranged in chronological order. Table 1 shows basic results obtained from the two 
surveys.     
 
 
4. Results 
Table 1. Croatian Conspiracy Theories in two surveys: 2007 and 2012. 
 2007 (%) 2012 (%) 
Strongly 
and 
somewhat 
disagree 
not 
decided 
Strongly 
and 
somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
and 
somewhat 
disagree 
not 
decided  
Strongly 
and 
somewhat 
disagree 
a) Presidents Tudjman and Milošević have arranged the division of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in Karadjordjevo. 
20 27 53 15 45 40 
b) The murder of Josip Reihl Kir8 was organised by Croatian 
extremists to whom the war with the Serbs was convenient. 
24 44 32 12 67 21 
c) In the course of aggression against Croatia, some great powers 
deliberately undermined its independence in order to preserve 
Yugoslavia. 
7 18 75 6 40 54 
d) Vukovar was sold in 1991 as part of a secret plan of territory 
swap. 
32 28 40 15 43 42 
e) Transition to market economy and privatisation were mostly the 
result of conspiracy between the Mob and the Government. 
7 18 75 4 31 65 
f) Crimes against civilians in military operations Flash and Storm are 
an expression of a carefully planned ethnic cleansing policy of the 
Croatian Government at that time. 
62 21 17 44 37 18 
g) The International Court in the Hague was founded with the 
intention of punishing those responsible for the disintegration of the 
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, abolish distinctions between the 
aggressor and the victims and conceal the real role of great powers 
in this conflict. 
17 27 56 12 41 47 
h) For more than a decade, the World Bank, IMF, and other 
international institutions have been economically and financially 
colonising Croatia. 
14 34 52 11 49 40 
i) Under the guise of patriotism, the underground intelligence works 
only for its own interests and settling accounts with non-
sympathizers. 
15 35 50 8 53 39 
j) The so-called human rights activists who are recruited from 
yugonostalgic groups and collaborators of foreign secret services 
are the most dangerous enemies of Croatia. 
39 31 30 26 49 25 
k) Since the mid 90’s, the parties which were then in the opposition, 
have been deliberately destabilizing the country and endangering its 
independence. 
50 31 19 30 48 22 
l) The European Union is a conspiracy of big business the aim of 
which is to destroy national states. 
46 28 26 29 42 29 
m) Far from the public eye and, contrary to the desire of its citizens, 
Croatia is attempting to join a new Balkan federation through 
regional integrations. 
59 26 15 33 45 22 
 
The analysis of the prevalence of beliefs in particular conspiratorial ideas reflects the controversy 
of opinions on the majority of events and processes contained in this scale. Only two theories can be 
denoted as consolidated conspiracy theories in 2007, the one claiming that great powers had undermined 
                                                          
7 Some of results that will be presented in this paper have been conducted in previous waves of the same research project. 
8 Josip Reihl-Kir was a well-known pacifist, chief of police in Osijek (city in the eastern part of Croatia), murdered in 1991 by a 
member of Croatian Army. 
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the process of independence of Croatia (75% support) and the one defining transition to market economy 
and privatisation as conspiracy of the Mob and the Government (75%). In 2012 research they are as well 
the most acceptable CTs among Croatian citizens. There is significantly more disagreement and dilemmas 
as to whether other events and processes derive from conspiracies, which makes them a sort of spectres 
of society the existence of which lacks consensus. Replication of this research in 2009 on a representative 
sample of citizens of Zagreb revealed the same results, and to a certain degree in the nation-wide survey in 
2012. Most of the studied events and processes are controversial for Croatian society even the two 
decades after they took place which may be an indication of certain lines of more global and permanent 
political cleavages.  
 
Table 2. Factorial structure of Croatian conspiracy theories in two surveys: 2007 and 2012. 
 2007 2012 
Government 
conspiracies 
during the 
90’. 
Conspiracies 
of internal 
and external 
enemies 
Conspiracies 
of internal 
and external 
enemies 
Government 
conspiracies 
during the 
90’. 
a) Presidents Tudjman and Milošević have arranged the division of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in Karadjordjevo. 
.786   .809 
b) The murder of Josip Reihl Kir was organised by Croatian extremists to whom 
the war with the Serbs was convenient. 
.771   .807 
c) In the course of aggression against Croatia, some great powers deliberately 
undermined its independence in order to preserve Yugoslavia. 
 .450 .386  
d) Vukovar was sold in 1991 as part of a secret plan of territory swap. .695   .736 
e) Transition to market economy and privatisation were mostly the result of 
conspiracy between the Mob and the Government. 
.658   .581 
f) Crimes against civilians in military operations Flash and Storm are an 
expression of a carefully planned ethnic cleansing policy of the Croatian 
Government at that time. 
.493   .488 
g) The International Court in the Hague was founded with the intention of 
punishing those responsible for the disintegration of the Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia, abolish distinctions between the aggressor and the victims and 
conceal the real role of great powers in this conflict. 
 .584 .635  
h) For more than a decade, the World Bank, IMF, and other international 
institutions have been economically and financially colonising Croatia. 
 .569 .734  
i) Under the guise of patriotism, the underground intelligence works only for its 
own interests and settling accounts with non-sympathizers. 
.541  .4589 .453 
j) The so-called human rights activists who are recruited from yugonostalgic 
groups and collaborators of foreign secret services are the most dangerous 
enemies of Croatia. 
 .744 .741  
k) Since the mid 90’s, the parties which were then in the opposition, have been 
deliberately destabilizing the country and endangering its independence. 
 .657 .760  
l) The European Union is a conspiracy of big business the aim of which is to 
destroy national states. 
 .685 .534  
m) Far from the public eye and, contrary to the desire of its citizens, Croatia is 
attempting to join a new Balkan federation through regional integrations. 
 .592 .695  
% of the explained variance  22.4 22.2 25.1 21.0 
KMO 0.776 0.784 
Bartlett's test of the significance of the correlation matrix  χ2 = 2958;df= 78; p = 0.000 χ2 = 2313;df= 78; p = 0.000 
    Note: It has been conducted PCA with varimax rotations. All factorial saturations below 0.35 have been excluded from the   
              representation.  
 
On one hand, these cleavages would be a reflection of political events which took place at the time 
and which are further reproduced in the future, but it should also be studied to what extent some earlier 
historical events reflect through them and correspond with them. What is interesting in 2012 survey results 
                                                          
9
 It seems that between two surveys domestic secret services have become another internal enemy, probably due to clarification 
of their problematic role, especially during the second part of 90s.  
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is a sort of escape into “not decided” category. This could be due to the introduction of younger generations 
in this sample, generations unaware or without direct experience with these controversial events, as well as 
due to a sort of oblivion or repression of turbulent period of war and transition. Nevertheless, controversies 
are still present and mostly unresolved.  
It is possible to look for more global and permanent cleavages by analyzing the relationships of 
these individual conspiracy beliefs. Factorial analysis reveals which beliefs are correlated in the minds of 
citizens and, if such relationships do exist, according to their common content we can infer about the 
character of the more global cleavages. According to that kind of analysis, in both researches results show 
that every CT belongs to one of the two groups of conspiratorial beliefs (Table 2). 
These two groups of theories are named Conspiracies of internal and external enemies and 
Government conspiracies in the 90’s. The first one is a reflection of the perceived threats to the 
accomplishments of national revolution, basically imagined as the metaphor of a body attacked by viruses 
which either come from the outside or are already within the body of the Nation (cf. Knight: 2001: 17). The 
common content of the second group of CTs is a critique of the abuse of Government power during the 
homeland war and processes of economic and democratic transition. This is a sort of accusation of the 
then governing party for violating the basic moral standards and the expectations of Croatian citizens from 
the new political system. 
To test our first hypothesis let’s look now at the relation of these cleavages to the one from the 
World War II.  
As regards the World War II cleavage, there are subjects whose ancestors were partisans (anti-
fascists) and two groups whose political tradition belongs to the Independent State of Croatia (quisling 
formation) respectively Home-Guards (regular, mobilized army) and Ustashas (fascists10). Besides them, 
there are people with mixed tradition (their Grandfathers and/or Grand-Grandfathers were on different 
sides) and those whose ancestors remained out of the conflict.  
According to our results from the last four waves of electoral behaviour studies, they are distributed 
in a way depicted in Figure 1. 
The observed general decrease in the memory of these military affiliations or family political 
biographies is not linear for all groups. During the first decade of the 21st century, in the light of electoral 
success of social democratic and liberal parties at the beginning of the period, subsequent diminishing of 
nationalism in HDZ, as well as a strong advocacy of the President Mesić for antifascist Croatian legacy, the 
memory of this legacy has become more openly expressed. What is observable in the same period is a 
decrease in the memory of military affiliation with troops of the Independent State of Croatia. But in 2012 
the increase of “out of conflict” category is surprisingly massive, as well as decrease in almost all other 
categories, especially in the groups with antifascist and mixed legacy. That indicates again certain 
repression as the function of the wish for leaving behind the traumatic past.   
                                                          
10 Croatian nationalist terrorist organization that came to power after the German invasion of Yugoslaviain 1941. The Ustasha 
deported and murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs and tens of thousands of Jews and Gypsies (Holokaust Encyclopedia, 
2001, 661). 
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Figure 1. 
Memory about family military affiliation during the II World War: longitudinal changes 2000-2012. 
 
 
But different affiliation is not merely a dead legacy. It also implies a different perception of the 
political leaders from that period, namely Josip Broz Tito, leader of the partisans and latter president of 
Yugoslavia, and Ante Pavelić, leader of the Ustasha movement and president of the Independent State of 
Croatia (Figure 2).  
These perceptions are in accordance with political legacy. The most profound differences are 
between those with fascist and anti-fascist political legacy11. Through the time interesting changes are 
discernable on the right part of the spectrum. Differences in evaluations of Tito and Pavelić among citizens 
with Ustasha tradition have diminished. The question is if this change could be attributed to the abandoning 
of Manichean frame of thinking and gradual adopting of historical facts about these two leaders? To answer 
it we would need a new and more nuanced research on perception of these two historical protagonists.  
 
                                                          
11 Such data has been collected in surveys of 2003, 2007, and 2012. Results of ANOVA for evaluation of Ante Pavelić: (2003) 
F=34.216; df=1105, 5; p=0,0001; (2007) F=31.471; df=1030, 5; p=0,0001;(2012) F=9.972; df=847, 5; p=0,0001. Results of 
ANOVA for evaluation of Josip Broz Tito: (2003) F=15.514; df=1130, 5; p=0,0001; (2007) F=18.170; df=1051, 5; p=0,0001 (2012) 
F=7.860; df=910, 5; p=0,0001. 
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Figure 2.  
Evaluation of World War II political leaders from perspectives of different political legacies in three surveys.12 
 
                                                          
12 Y-axis represents average results on the scale from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive) evaluation. 
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a) Interesting results are obtained as regards the relation between the political legacy and 
propensity to certain conspiracy theories referring to recent Croatian past (Figure 3).  
The conducted variance analyses for the 2007 results show considerable differences among 
groups regarding both dimensions of conspiratorial thinking13.  
Subjects with an anti-fascist legacy believe more in Government conspiracies in the 90’s in respect 
to those belonging to the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) tradition, either home guards or ustashas 
(fascists). The situation is opposite when we analyze beliefs in conspiracies involving internal and external 
enemies. This belief is the strongest and considerably more pronounced in subjects belonging to the 
ustasha tradition, then those of the home guard tradition, and finally those belonging to the anti-fascist 
tradition.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  
Beliefs in conspiracy theories and family political tradition of family from the World War II 14. 
 
 
These results clearly indicate that in 2007 the belief in two kinds of Croatian conspiracy theories 
was partly an expression of the historical cleavage dating from World War II. The question is in which 
                                                          
13 For government conspiracies in the 90's: F=10.136; df=858, 5; p=0,0001. For conspiracies involving internal and external 
enemies: F=11.397; df=858, 5; p=0,0001. 
14 Results for both dimensions are expressed by means of standardized values (M=100, sd=10). 
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manner it has manifested itself: as previous perceptive priming or as a subsequent interpretation of the 
past. We can generally assume that, according to historical experience, or sedimented memory there 
existed potentials for such a perception, but a significant role was also played by the president Tudjman ’s 
informal politics of “reconciliation” which non-selectively rehabilitated the ustasha movement making it a 
positive point of identification, not only in the sense of absolving the patriotic motivation of members of this 
tradition, but also, in one part of them, with regards to the identification with fascistic ideology, both in the 
old and in the new generations.  
As regards the preference of certain types of conspiracy theories, this would imply that a specific 
memory of the political past partly influenced the readiness to perceive some subjects, groups, or factors as 
potential enemies, but this memory was also the symbolic resource for the subsequent devising of 
relationships through the vocabulary of the past - especially ethnic intolerance – as well as for the 
inclination to tolerance of criminal behaviour, „privatisation“ of the state, and violation of civil rights. But, 
was it siege mentality that made them turn a blind eye to the respect of morals or are we here dealing with 
hypocrisy. I will try to answer that question in the last thesis’ argumentation.  
But in 2012 significant changes happened for several groups15. The most profound is in group with 
fascist legacy. In 2007 they were at the “national” front, defending it from internal and external enemies, but 
in 2012 they’ve abandoned such position and became moderately critical toward politics of HDZ during the 
90’s. General discreditation of HDZ corruptive politics as well as its interpretation of recent past, along with 
ideological transformation of this “legacy group” from extreme nationalists to some more conventional 
ideology may be the reasons for these changes. The results are in accordance with these assumptions. 
From 2007 to 2012, voting support for HDZ in this group has decreased from 60,6 % to 33,5 % and the 
number of declared nationalists decreased from 10,5 % in 2007 to 0 % in 2012. In the same period their 
identification has significantly increased with liberalism (from 7,9 % to 18,4 %), social-democracy (from 
13,2% to 19,4%) and Christian democracy (from 52,6% to 55,1%).   
Other changes, especially for “out of conflict”, “don’t knowers” and mixed legacy groups are in the 
line of indecisiveness if the Government during 90’s has been involved in the unacceptable behaviour. Only 
two groups, of Partisan and Home Guard legacy have shown stability in their opposite perception of recent 
history. 
Now, one could say these memories are indeed mutually related, but do they really matter in the 
context of present political behaviour? 
For that purpose, I will now explore the relevance of the Second World War cleavage as well as of 
the recent cleavage - expressed through the two types of CTs - for the electoral behaviour in Croatia in 
2007 and 2012. 
In order to determine the differences in the voting behaviour among groups of different political 
legacy, chi-square tests, along with Contingency Coefficients are conducted. Results in the next table show 
that this relationship between voting behaviour and political legacy is significant and moderate as well as in 
accordance with left-right cleavage in Croatia. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Diferences between groups are smaller but still significant. For government conspiracies in the 90's: F=6.920; df=996, 5; 
p=0,0001. For conspiracies involving internal and external enemies: F=3.593; df=996, 5; p=0,003 
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Table 3. Voting behaviour and Croatian political legacy in 2007 and 201216 
 
 
Partisans Out of conflict On several sides Don’t know Home Guards Ustashas 
 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 2007 2012 
DC 0 0 0 .66 0 0 0 0 .99 0.8 3.96 0 0 0 
HDZ 17.96 7.42 28.29 23.82 36.07 40.21 36.14 26.59 40.59 27.78 60.61 33.45 
HNS 11.65 3.38 9.87 2.55 8.2 2.64 7.43 1.87 3.96 2.48 6.06 0 
HSS 1.94 0.58 3.95 3.57 6.56 0 3.96 4.69 7.92 3.69 0 0 
HSLS 3.88 1.29 5.92 1.04 0 0 1.98 0.43 2.97 1.86 0 3.07 
HSP 1.46 3.41 1.97 2.69 6.56 4.37 4.46 2.13 3.96 4 12.12 6.6 
HSU 7.77 3.15 7.89 1.9 3.28 2.69 6.44 0.91 6.93 1.66 0 0 
HDSSB 1.46 0.78 1.97 3.22 0 0 1.49 1.77 1.98 10.47 3.03 0 
IDS 4.85 3.25 1.97 0.96 0 0 2.97 0.5 0 0 0 0 
SDP 47.57 52.62 35.53 29.98 37.7 26.89 31.68 34.99 19.8 16.7 12.12 17.91 
Other 1.46 10.92 1.97 13.07 1.64 6.44 2.48 6.02 7.92 15.26 6.06 14.98 
Croatian 
Laburists 
/ 4.28 / 5.41 / 7.22 / 3.52 / 8.99 / 2.49 
Don’t 
know 
/ 8.92 / 11.79 / 9.54 / 15.78 / 7.11 / 21.5 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
χ2 2007 = 122.655, df = 50, p = 0.0001. Contingency Coeff. = 0.374. 
χ2 2012 = 162.652, df = 90, p = 0.0001. Contingency Coeff. = 0.408. 
 
 
b) In order to determine the differences in the conspiratorial beliefs between voters of particular 
political parties conducted are simple analysis of variances. Significant differences were obtained in respect 
to both conspiratorial dimensions17 (see Figure 4).  
In 2007 voters of SDP and HNS are in the lead as regards belief in theories of Government 
conspiracies in the 90’s. In the highest degree they differed from voters of HDZ among which the support of 
this kind of conspiracy theory is least pronounced when considering the whole sample. In terms of 
tendencies, these and other results mostly reflect the relation between the Government and the opposition 
which existed in the 90’s (this applies to parties which existed at that time). Voters of the oppositional 
parties strongly believe in the conspiracies of the Government during 90’s, but the voters of the ruling party 
strongly disbelieve in them. Completely opposite results are obtained for the belief in conspiracies of 
internal and external enemies. Voters of the strongly nationalistic parties (HSP and HDZ) were prone in 
2007 to believe in this kind of CTs while voters of the social-democratic and liberal parties were reluctant to 
believe in them. These results suggest that the analyzed conspiratorial cleavages are constitutive as an 
informational base for the left-right antagonism. That is corroborated by the substantial correlation between 
beliefs in conspiracies and left-right self-identification of the citizens (rGC= -,420; rIEE=,323). These 
correlations are smaller but still significant in 2012 (rGC= -,244; rIEE=,226). Reasons for such decrease are 
                                                          
16 Party abbreviations refer to the following parties: DC (Democratic Center), HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union – conservatives 
and nationalists ), HNS (Croatian Peoples Party – liberal democrats), HSS (Croatian Peasants Party – moderate conservative 
party), HSLS (Croatian Social-Liberal Party), HSP (Croatian Party of Rights – nationalistic extreme right party), HSU (Croatian 
Party of Pensioners – more interest group then political party), HDSSB (Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja – 
regional conservative party), IDS (Istrian Democratic Assembly – regional liberal democrats), SDP (Social-Democratic Party), 
Croatian Laburists (recently established socialist party).   
17 For government conspiracies in the nineties: (2007) F=25.951; df=596, 9; p=0.0001, (ETA=.524); (2012) F=5.114; df= 780,14; 
p=0.0001 , (ETA=.269). For conspiracies involving internal and external enemies: F=7.984; df=596, 9; p=0.0001, (ETA=.326); 
(2012) F=4.668; df= 780, 14; p=0.0001 , (ETA=.305).  
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not only in the ideological “softening” of rightist parties but also in lower level of competition between main 
electoral opponents due to HDZ burden of corruption affairs and loss of credibility. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  
Beliefs in conspiracy theories and voting behaviour: changes from 2007 to 201218. 
 
 
In 2012 only smaller changes have occurred in SDP and HNS beliefs in both types of conspiracy 
theories. But, it seems that voters of rightist parties (HDZ, HSP and HDSSB) have accepted in higher 
degree critical stance to the role of HDZ during the period of transition and state building. Although in 
significant degree HDSSB lowered its beliefs in external and internal enemies of the nation, all three groups 
of voters are still very prone to these conspiratorial ideas. It seems that their nationalistic identity is very 
stable. Other interesting changes are those of HSLS and, in smaller degree of HSS. HSLS voters have 
shown dramatic change from highly critical opposition towards HDZ to the one of its apologetes. Not so 
dramatic, but in the same direction, changes have occurred in the HSS. Those parties were in the mandate 
from 2007 to 2011 strategic partners with HDZ, inspite of bigger inclination of their voters to the coalition 
with SDP. In 2011 elections those parties literary imploded. Only HSS reached only one seat in the 
Croatian parliament. The majority of critical voters have probably  abandoned them. 
Further, it is possible to clearly notice the extent to which the inclination towards conspiracy 
theories “influences“ the attitudes towards political parties19 by means of regression analyses which show 
interesting results (Figure 5).   
  
                                                          
 18 The results of both dimensions are expressed by means of standardized values (M=100, sd=10). 
19 We use them as an alternative variable to voting behaviour. 
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Figure 5.  
Predictive “strength” of conspiracy theories for attitudes toward political parties in 2007 and 2012 surveys. 
 
 
In 2007 the attitudes towards HDZ and SDP, main competitors on the Croatian political scene, and 
towards parties close to them, i.e. HSP and HNS respectively, can be successfully predicted by means of 
these theories. By beliefs in CTs it is possible to explain about a quarter of variance of the main 
competitors’ voting behaviour. This predictive strength is of an equal degree as that of the left-right self-
identification, which is one of the strongest. On the contrary, as it is shown in Figure 5, the belief in 
conspiracy theories does not have any predictive value for the attitude towards parties of the centre, HSLS, 
HSS, and HSU. 
The reasons underlying this correlation can be attributed to the significance of information from the 
past which appear in certain conspiracy theories as the foundations for enduring evaluation of the past and 
recent behaviour and perceptive filter for the evaluation of future behaviour of political parties. As we have 
seen in the previous results, this relation partly derives from the historical-ideological cleavage in the 
electorate and the presumed political experience in the 90’s which resulted in the current political cleavage 
between left and right, understood as the opposition between the Social Democratic-Liberal and the 
Conservative-Nationalistic pole. 
Moreover, a high level of competition in 2007 elections, i.e. polarisation between the major political 
competitors can also contribute to the prominence of these conspiracy theories, related to the recent 
Croatian past. Mayor competitors were using conspiracy theories as informational sources of distinctions 
which are, moreover, linked to the ideological dimension important for the origin of their opposition. This 
information is not a relevant basis for decision making in the case of voters of minor parties whose aim is to 
win votes outside of this historical ideological matrix of antagonism and which are, consequently, located in 
the ideological center. In 2012, in the situation of predictable HDZ loss of elections, polarization based on 
these and similar bipolar oppositions lost its predictive “strength”. But the same phenomenon as a 
framework of competition between mayor protagonists of Croatian bipolar party system clearly survived in 
smaller degree. Future is opened to its re-usage.  
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So far, we have seen an interrelation of cleavages from the past and recent times and their 
significance for the present political behaviour. What about the influence of this recently developed 
interpretations in terms of values and identity?  
c) What kinds of political goals, values and collective identities do these conspiratorial beliefs 
promote? Or, more precisely, what kind of collective identifications were built on the basis of these two 
types of conspiratorial beliefs? In order to answer these questions CT’s have been correlated to previously 
factorized preferred goals of citizens regarding Government politics20. Organized in more global structures, 
they also express the main political values. Another more global political orientation included in this 
analysis has been estimated through the scale of Authoritarianism. 
 
Table 4. Correlations of political goals and values with types of conspiratorial thinking.  
 
“Organic 
strengthening” of 
the Nation (in 
terms of military 
and population 
growth and 
diaspora support) 
“Europeanization” of 
Croatia (in terms of 
entrance in the EU, 
protection of minority 
rights, development of 
regions and  
decentralization) 
“Fight” against 
societal 
pathologies (in 
terms of 
criminal, 
corruption, war 
crimes, 
violation of 
human and 
social rights) 
Protection of 
discriminated 
groups 
(women, 
youth etc.) 
Improvement of 
the life quality 
(in terms of 
social and 
economic 
status and 
employment) 
Authoritarianism 
2007 
Conspiracies of internal 
and external enemies 
0.435** -0.385** -0.024 0.017 -0.024 0.435** 
Government 
conspiracies in the 90’s 
-0.314** 0.203** 0.252** 0.077* 0.110** -0.105* 
2012 
Conspiracies of internal 
and external enemies 
0.158** -0.085* -0.050 0.017 -0.023 0.221** 
Government 
conspiracies in the 90’s 
-0.163** -0.004 0.041 0.047 0.039 -0.097* 
       ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
 
 
It is obvious that not all CTs are the same. They promote corresponding goals and values to 
various degrees in different political and social circumstances. CTs of internal and external enemies 
promote a closed out ethnic identity and authoritarian values. By contrast,  CTs about Government in the 
90’s promote an open unfinished identity, critical skills and democratic values. It seems that these two 
types of CTs express wider political antagonism between nationalism and democratization. But this 
antagonism is expressed through CTs in significantly lower level in 2012. Reasons could be found in the 
consequences of passed path toward accession to the European Union and accepted rule of law and 
democratic competition. But we should be very careful in stating this because of still present potentials for 
“simulated” democracy, with reduced democratic institutions and norms to bare façade, often practiced by 
political elites, not only in young democracies these days (cf. Lengyel and Ilonszki 2012: 2).  
In the 2012 survey we tried to explore such perception of simulated democracy through several 
items. Both types of conspiratorial thinking are significantly correlated with these statements as well as with 
the general perception of simulated democracy (see Table 5). 
 
 
                                                          
20
 They are expressed in the first line of the table 4 as five groups of values and goals. Those are ortogonal facors, obtained 
through the Principal Component Analysis with varimax rotations. 
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Table 5. Correlations of “simulated democracy” perceptions with types of conspiratorial thinking. 
 
Democracy 
is just a 
guise 
through 
which rich 
people hold 
others 
obedient. 
Parliament is 
just the show 
for the people, 
real decisions 
are made 
elsewhere. 
Politics is 
very close to 
the crime. 
The quality of 
democracy is 
not important 
because people 
are sheep 
anyway, in the 
need for 
shepherds.  
Propaganda is to 
a democracy 
what violence is 
to a dictatorship. 
Laws are 
written for 
weaklings. 
Politicians are 
looking only 
for their own 
interests.  
General 
perception of 
simulated 
democracy◊ 
2012 
Conspiracies of 
internal and 
external 
enemies 
0.367** 0.326** 0.258** 0.367** 0.319** 0.241** 0.271** 0.436** 
Government 
conspiracies in 
the 90’s 
0.147** 0.099** 0.221** 0.093** 0.173** 0.105** 0.120** 0.193** 
       ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; ◊ This is general factor obtained through the PCA analysis. It explains 50.14% of variance of all first-row items included in the table. 
 
 
Although one could expect stronger relationship of beliefs in government conspiracies and 
perception of simulated democracy because of the same orientation against immoralities and corruptive 
behaviour of political elites, it seems that pessimistic cynicism is expressed among those concerned with 
Manichean way of looking at politics. Put together with other well-known, as well as, in this paper previously 
analyzed variables in the stepwise regression model21, the best predictors of “simulating democracy” 
perception are again our conspiracy theories. Along with Authoritarianism, general (mis)trust in political 
institutions and education they explain more than 30 % of the variance of perceiving democracy simulated.   
  
 
Table 6. Regression of predictors of “simulated democracy” general perception. 
Predictors: β 
Conspiracies of internal and external enemies 0.377 
Government conspiracies in the 90’s 0.223 
General trust in socio-political institutions -0.206 
Education level -0.128 
Authoritarianism 0.091 
R2 0.559 
R2 adj. 0.308 
 
 
On the first sight one could consider these results as a demonstration of “dark side” potential of 
conspiratorial thinking. Certainly we should be worried to see these clear signs of democracy crisis, 
especially because the type of conspiratorial thinking that express pro-democratic inclination appears as 
the relevant predictor. But we should ask ourselves what are the conditions of emergence of such 
experience of personal and/or collective instrumentalization and sense of exclusion from the political 
decision-making processes among citizens?  
                                                          
21 In the begining of the stepwise model included were the next predictors: beliefs in conspiracies of internal and external 
enemies, beliefs in government conspiracies in the 90's, four „goals and values“ variables, Authoritarianism, left-right 
identification (0-10 scale), three variables of the trust: general trust in socio-political institutions, trust in church vs. central political 
institutions (parliament, government and president), trust in „civil society“ organizations vs. repressive state apparatus, and 
education level. Only significant predictors are shown in the table 6. 
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Stability and efficacy of institutional arrangements, especially in countries weak in democratic 
tradition largely depend on the quality and conduct of emerging elites, their acceptance of the rules, 
consistent behaviour, promoted discourse and willingness to accept each other’s legitimacy (ibid). All these 
instances are in a certain degree still problematic not only in Croatia. Furthermore, in the context of 
developing more global economic and political crisis, simplified explanations of political realities - especially 
reasons for the crisis itself - could easily fail on fertile soil of unfulfilled accomplishments. They are in a 
smaller degree dangerous weapon in the mouths of extremist parties, but could become lethal when the 
national mainstream parties try to install protectionist policies. Also, such circumstances and ways of 
collective thinking are suitable for development of various populist movements. Even though populism is a 
usual ingredient of democracy, different appeals and imageries of these movements have different political 
potentials. This is easily observable in our two types of conspiracy theories. Filled with empty signifiers of 
nation, war, peoples will etc., along with speaking from the position of (or in behalf of) the center of political 
power, they strive to protect a monolithically conceived system and a certain form of organically conceived 
community. But, this is not an instance of non-reflexive dogmatism, as it may look like at first sight, but 
rather a way of functioning of so called pseudo-transformational leaders and their cynical reason (Sloterdijk 
1992). When pseudo-transformational leaders dominate, the use of manipulation widens, leaders override 
human rights and democratic institutional framework, and unbiased information is hard to obtain (Masciulli 
2009: 472). Such politics citizens easily recognize, and some of them adopt the same discourse in banal or 
in reflexive and double-minded way. In a neglected position regarding their political education, along with 
totalitarian legacy and political role narrowed mostly to voting, the most ruinous consequence for their 
political culture would be passive acceptance of the simulated democracy, laconically expressed in the 
sentence:  
 
„They know what they are doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances and the instinct for 
self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are telling them that it has to be so.”  
(Sloterdijk: 21).  
 
In such cases vicious compatibility between citizens and pseudo-transformational elites is 
established. The question is: 
 
 
5. What is to be done? 
This question overcomes the case of Croatia and answer should be given at least in the context of 
current European political and economic crisis. 
To solve the crisis and reinforce stability I openly argue for “more Europe”, more social and more 
egalitarian Europe with more involved citizens, not consumers or just tax payers. It also means arguing for 
a new frame of thinking that goes beyond the nation-state model that has prevailed in Europe since the end 
of the Middle Ages. That is to say beyond mythical motherlands and beyond cynicism as described by 
Sloterdijk as “enlightened false consciousness”. That is “modernized unhappy consciousness”, which ”has 
learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was not able to put them into practice” 
(ibid). We can add: for the sake of its own enjoyment. To overcome that, we need cheekiness that implies 
courage to foster democracy beyond the bounds of nation and probably to work against the memory of their 
naturalized relationship in the context of critical relationship to the history. In this case, the enjoyment of 
subjective affiliation should be accomplished in realization of universal principles of human rights and 
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norms, values and procedures of liberal democracy as a basis for a shared political culture. To accomplish 
this, all available critical potentials should be activated. 
Furthermore, in order to be functional, reality has to be created by something that is not fully actual. 
By this I mean that we need a sort of reflexive vision, like Victor Hugo’s vision - as a motivator for 
achievement - imbued with open look to the past, and radical democratic values, ideals and plans for their 
realization, even if many of these ideas would be considered as sheer illusions by generations to come. 
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